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ABSTRACT: This essay defends an idea that is no longer fashionable: that there is a whole.  
The motivation for a defense of this notion has nothing to do with intellectual conservatism or 
a penchant for Hegel.  Rather, what we hope to establish is a second path into what Alain 
Badiou has called the ‘Cantorian Revolution’.  In order to open this path we undertake a 
three-fold task.  First, we deconstruct Badiou’s onto-logical project by isolating the suppressed 
significance of Ernst Zermelo.  This point allows us to recover a Cantorian possibility for 
addressing the infinite as an inconsistent whole.  Second, we turn to work by the logician 
Graham Priest in order to remove the absurdity of discussing true contradictions.  Finally, we 
return to Jacques Derrida’s early work on Husserl in order to chart a phenomenological path 
to an affirmation of an inconsistent whole.  We close, then, with the implications for 
contemporary philosophy. 
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1.  THERE IS NO WHOLE? 
This essay defends an idea that is no longer fashionable: that there is a whole.  There 
are many detractors of this notion, though recently Alain Badiou has provided a 
novel, non-ethical reason for its rejection: such a notion fails to make the turn into the 
Cantorian Revolution, and any position that fails to do so is doomed to repeat the 
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failures of the metaphysics of presence.1  In opposition to this consensus, and 
especially Badiou’s criticism, what we hope to articulate here is a novel concept of the 
whole—one that withstands contemporary criticism.  In order to do this, we are going 
to take up the work of Jacques Derrida, already panned by Badiou’s supporters, in 
order to develop our new sense of the whole.2  Specifically, we find in Derrida’s early 
work on the experience of the undecidable a statement of what constitutes a defense 
of the whole, but which equally breaks with Hegel’s conception of the absolute.  Our 
thesis is the following: the experience of the undecidable is the experience of an inconsistent whole.  
Like Socrates at his trial, when after being found guilty suggests that he ought to be 
rewarded with free meals for life at the Prytaneum, the aim of this essay amounts to a 
defense of Derrida by an admission of guilt.  Derrida was a thinker of ‘finitude’, he 
did not make the turn into the ‘Cantorian Revolution’, and he was a thinker of the 
‘whole’.  For all these transgressions, we claim our just dessert: that Badiou himself 
may be wrong.  Or perhaps even more strongly phrased: it is we who remain 
Cantorian, since Cantor after all did hold that there was a whole, while Badiou is 
rather the descendant of Ernst Zermelo.   
The stakes of this encounter, then, should be sufficiently clear.  The possibility of 
transcendental philosophy, a philosophy that would seek to ascertain the limits of 
thought, has been exhausted.  This end, however, constitutes a new beginning.  It is 
the birth of infinite thought.  While Badiou has established one possible way through to 
this goal, if we are right, there are two such paths, and failing to meet the 
requirements of one need not be counted as failing to make the turn into infinite 
thought.  A second closely related consequence of our thesis is the production of a 
program of research.  The role of truth procedures, events, and the possibility of an 
inconsistent ontology are all suggested.  Perhaps most promising, however, is that it 
provides the way to another model of subjective intervention, which we provisionally 
call beauty or nobility (kalos).  This pay-off should entice us enough at least to 
entertain the possibility of another path into infinite thought. 
                                                     
1 For Badiou’s statement concerning the ‘Cantorian Revolution’ see for example Being and Event, trans. 
Oliver Feltham, New York, Continuum Press, 2005, p. 274 (Henceforth BE). 
2 See for example Peter Hallward, ‘The Politics of Prescription’, South Atlantic Quarterly vol. 104, 2005, pp. 
769-89, or Antonio Calcagno’s essay ‘Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou: Is There a Relation Between 
Politics and Time?’, Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 30, 2004, pp. 799-815, and book Badiou and Derrida: 
Politics, Events and their Time, New York, Continuum Press, 2007.  Two caveats here are pertinent.  First, 
we acknowledge that Calcagno is no uncritical fan of Badiou’s work.  Our point here is that he certainly 
compares him favorably to Derrida.  Second, one should not take away the impression that we here 
disagree with Calcagno.  Indeed, it is only because we significantly agree with his assessment of Derrida’s ‘finitude’ 
that we are able to make this defense of Derrida. 
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2. ZERMELO’S REVOLUTION  
We should like to begin our engagement with Badiou by noting a ghostly presence 
within Badiou’s own thought—a specter (revenant) who haunts the whole of his onto-
logy.  Consider the following statement from Being and Event: ‘That it is necessary to 
tolerate the almost complete arbitrariness of a choice, that quantity, the very 
paradigm of objectivity, leads to pure subjectivity; such is what I would willingly call 
the Cantor-Gödel-Cohen-Easton symptom’ (BE 280).  We are not here interested in 
this full itinerary, which is punctuated by the names of four great mathematicians, but 
only its first point, and the unmentioned name that stands between Cantor and Gödel, 
namely Ernst Zermelo.  This mathematician, who is present only as a dash in 
Badiou’s thought, we argue forms the symptomal point of his enterprise.  If attended 
to correctly, we argue it is here that one can uncover an alternative appropriation of 
Cantor. 
2.1 Against the Whole 
The ‘Cantorian Revolution’ in Badiou’s thought is tantamount to the rejection of the 
whole.  After Cantor established that it was possible to think the infinite, reversing 
more than two millennia’s wisdom on the matter, there was a short period in which 
set theory operated by use of something like Gottlob Frege’s unlimited abstraction 
principle, which had the advantage of allowing mathematicians to obtain almost all the 
sets necessary for mathematics from it alone.3  It was as follows: given a well defined 
property P, there exists a unique set A that consists of only those things that have the 
property P.  Usually, such a set is expressed with braces as follows: {x | P(x)}, which 
means ‘the set of all x having the property x’. 
The difficulties with this principle are well-known: such a principle allows for self-
membership.  If some sets can be members of themselves, then others are sets that are 
not members of themselves.  That this distinction results in a logical paradox was an 
observation Bertrand Russell made (and Zermelo independently), and has come to be 
known as Russell’s paradox.4  The response of the mathematical community was to 
try to avoid this inconsistency by addressing or reformulating the abstraction 
principle.  This aim was the point of Russell’s theory of types.  Yet, in the end the 
solution that was provided by Ernst Zermelo (in 1908) proved most acceptable. 
                                                     
3 We note that Badiou rightly counts Frege as the second attempt to think a set, while Cantor’s intuition 
of objects constitutes the first (BE 40). 
4 For those interested, Badiou reproduces this paradox in Being and Event pages 40-1, and more thoroughly 
in Logics of Worlds, trans. Oliver Feltham, New York, Continuum Press, pp. 153-5  (Henceforth: LW). 
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Zermelo’s reformulation, as Badiou explains, is to produce a limited principle of 
abstraction by requiring that one already have a set from which a property could 
specify a new set.  Badiou expresses this principle, now known as the axiom of 
separation, as follows:  ‘If α is given, the set of elements of α which possesses an 
explicit property (of the type λ(β)) also exists’ (BE 501).  The change can be noted 
symbolically as follows: {x | x   A and P(x)}, which means ‘the set of all x that are 
both members of A and have property x’.   
The set-theoretical results are two-fold.  First, since one must specify a new set 
only from a previous set, one now conceives of sets in a hierarchy, called V, which is 
punctuated by two axioms of existence: the null set axiom, and the axiom of infinity.  
Because it is involved, and because Badiou has aptly demonstrated its construction in 
Being and Event, we shall not here review it.  The general point is that one establishes 
an operation of succession and builds new sets from basic sets established by each of 
the axioms of existence.  This is why this solution is often called the ‘set-builder’ 
approach.  Second, there is no set of all sets, which is ‘in effect the mathematical 
concept of the Whole’ (LW 153).  If there were, one would encounter Russell’s 
paradox.  Thus, there is no Whole, and by the axiom of separation one cannot 
produce it.5  Since these conclusions follow directly from Zermelo rather than Cantor, 
then, it might be more accurate to call what Badiou addresses in both volumes of 
Being and Event not Cantor’s but Zermelo’s Revolution. 
2.2 Critique of Finitude 
One pay-off for this revolution is that Badiou is able to develop an ontology that does 
not fall to the critiques of the metaphysics of presence, since at no point is a unity 
produced that is foundational (i.e. the null-set is a set with empty extension, there is 
no set of all sets, and the independence of the continuum hypothesis ensures that the 
ordering of V does not itself produce a unity).  Another is that he is able to level a 
critique of almost all contemporary philosophy, Anglo-American and Continental.  
Since Derrida is one of the many targets of this latter critique, we shall focus on it 
here. 
This critique has two prongs, only one of which is important to our task.  The first 
is a critique of correlationism.  While this was a point Badiou first developed on his 
own, he has more recently changed his tactic, since it found fuller expression in 
                                                     
5 This statement requires a caveat, since, even as Badiou argues in Being and Event, the axiom of 
foundation is also necessary to ensure that the theoretical possibility of the whole is excluded (see 
Meditation 18). 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 155 
Quentin Meillassoux’ work After Finitude.6  In Logics of Worlds, then, one finds that 
Badiou simply approves of Meillassoux’ ‘fossil’s argument’ (LW 119).  Since this prong 
does not concern the status of the whole, however, we are going to focus on the 
second prong, which also focuses more specifically on phenomenology and 
hermeneutics.  In the third appendix of Being and Event he writes the following. 
The common conception is that what happens ‘at the limit’ is more complex 
than what happens in one sole supplementary step.  One of the weaknesses of 
the ontologies of Presence is their validation of this conception.  The mysterious 
and captivating effect of these ontologies, which mobilize the resources of the 
poem, is that of installing us in the premonition of being as beyond and horizon, 
as maintenance and opening-forth of being-in-totality.  As such, an ontology of 
Presence will always maintain that operations ‘at the limit’ present the real peril 
of thought .... Mathematical ontology warns us of the contrary. ... [I]t is not the 
global gathering together ‘at the limit’ which is innovative and complex, it is 
rather the realization, on the basis of the point at which one finds oneself, of the 
one-more of a step.  Intervention is an instance of the point, not of the place (BE 
451). 
This is an argument that Badiou has continued to develop through Logics of Worlds, 
where it comes under the heading of democratic materialism, and it is closely 
connected to his critique of nihilism in his short work on ethics.7  The outline of this 
critique, which one can see in the above quotation, can be parsed into the following 
argument.   
Ontologies of presence, which include Derrida’s radicalization of phenomenology, 
are committed to thinking the meaning of being without presence.  Yet, this school of 
thought is also committed to the position that understanding (verstehen) is finite.  It is 
this latter commitment that prevents the achievement of the former, since any such 
limit or horizon of understanding is itself a ghostly presence.8  One can witness that 
the limit is a ghostly presence because commitment to this position does not allow one 
to pass to intervention except by betraying the truth (alētheia) of the limit situation.  It is 
                                                     
6 See especially the first and last chapters of Meillassoux’ After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier, New York, Continuum Press, 2008. 
7 See especially chapter three of Alain Badiou Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter 
Hallward, New York, Verso Press, 2002.  
8 Badiou explicitly states that constraining being by a limit reinstates the power of the One, or the 
metaphysics of presence in Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, trans. Norman 
Madarasz, Albany, State University of New York, 2006 as follows: ‘we have to assume, as did Lucretius, 
that manifold-unfolding [=being as pure multiplicity] is not constrained by the immanence of a limit.  
For it is only too obvious that such a constraint proves the power of the One as grounding the multiple 
itself’ (pp. 35-6). 
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this impotence of finite thought that constitutes its nihilism.  For the purposes of 
clarity later, let us call the foregoing the ghostly presence argument.  Our question now is 
simple: what are we to learn from it? 
The lessons of Zermelo’s Revolution may at first appear only negative.  First, they 
amount to a rejection of the whole.  In a certain way, though, one may say that this 
anti-Hegelian goal animates almost all of contemporary philosophy.  In this sense, 
then, it is not special.  Yet, second, if Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism 
addresses all contemporary philosophy, the ghostly presence argument has it in for anyone 
committed to the overcoming of the metaphysics of presence.  A preoccupation with 
limit situations, philosophies on the verge, the thematics of death, and especially the 
horizon shattering epiphany of saturated (especially religious) phenomena are all 
imperiled.9  The theological turn, motivated by the aim to assess the most liminal of 
all situations, is at best a confusion, since no thought occurs there.  One must choose: 
attempt to complete Heidegger’s project, and thus finally complete the death of gods 
(including the poetic), or embrace the impotent nihilism that follows.10 Yet, all this 
critique comes with a positive lesson: Zermelo’s Revolution shows that there is a viable 
path to accomplishing Heidegger’s most fundamental commitments, which of course 
requires a commitment to some form of materialism (Badiou’s dialectical or 
Meillassoux’ speculative).  In turning to our critique of Badiou, what we aim to point 
out is that this project also opens up the possibility for another path to infinite thought. 
3. THE CANTORIAN REVOLUTION 
If it is Zermelo’s revolution that establishes the transfinite as a thinkable realm for 
Badiou, then what precisely was Cantor’s revolution?  Zermelo, as we saw, set-
theoretically eliminates discussion of the whole.  Cantor, by contrast, did think that 
there was a whole.  Furthermore, he reserved the name ‘God’ for this whole in his 
private writings.  Let us survey some of Cantor’s grounds for these conclusions. 
                                                     
9 Badiou directly opposes philosophy to religion in Conditions, trans. Steven Corcoran, New York, 
Continuum Press, 2008 as follows: ‘I propose to call ‘religion’ everything that presupposes that there is a 
continuity between truths and the circulation of meaning [sens].  We can thus say: philosophy is what, 
against every hermeneutics, against the religious law of meaning, assembles compossible truths on the 
basis of the void.  Philosophy then subtracts thought from every presupposition of Presence’ (p. 24). 
10 It is surprising to me that in the attempts to integrate Badiou and Jean-Luc Marion have failed to 
address this point.  Adam S. Miller, for example, in ‘Reduction or Subtraction: Jean-Luc Marion, Alain 
Badiou, and the Recuperation of Truth’, Philosophy Today, vol. 51, SPEP Supplement, 2007, pp. 23-32 
never addresses this point once.  This point holds all the more for his book Badiou, Marion and St. Paul: 
Immanent Grace, New York, Continuum, 2008, which focuses on their models of the event.  While Miller is 
quite aware of the thinker’s differences on religion, any serious attempt to reconcile these thinkers must 
pay more attention to this point, since it is here that one finds the root of their disagreement. 
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What must be understood concerning Cantor’s mathematical innovation is that it 
was born from a specifically metaphysical (onto-theological) context.  Cantor followed 
the Aristotelian practice of drawing a distinction between the potentially infinite 
(apeiron) and actually infinite (aphōrismenon).  The former concerned an undetermined, 
variable finite quantity, ‘which either increases beyond all limits ... or decreases 
beneath any finite small limit’.11  The latter, by contrast, concerned a quantity that 
was not variable, and also surpassed every finite quantity in magnitude.  Traditionally 
this latter infinity was understood to be totally incomprehensible, and so not suitable 
for scientific study.  To avoid this conclusion, then, Cantor drew a distinction between 
two types of actual infinities, breaking with the onto-theological tradition: 
[W]e must make a fundamental distinction here between: 
IIa Increasable actual-infinite or transfinite 
IIb Unincreasable actual-infinite or Absolute.12 
What he meant by such a distinction seems fairly clear.  Any typical transfinite 
ordinal, such as ω0 or ω1, has a greater.  It is always possible to collect up all these 
ordinals into their limit to produce a limit ordinal, but these limit ordinals can 
themselves simply be used to produce yet another level of transfinite numbers.  Each 
of these ordinals, then, is actually infinite, increasable, and thinkable for humans, so 
that Cantor called them transfinite.  The totality of all such ordinals, however, is 
unincreasable (Unvermehrares), and incomprehensible, and it is for this reason that 
Cantor calls it the Absolute.   
Though he was not totally consistent in his public statements and private writings, 
Cantor was nevertheless clear on the connection between this Absolute and God.  
Starting with his private writings, we note that Cantor simply equates the two: 
What surpasses all that is finite and transfinite ... is the single completely 
individual unity in which everything is included, which includes the ‘Absolute’ 
incomprehensible to the human understanding.  This is the ‘Actus Purissimus’ 
which by many is called ‘God.’13 
While the motivations for this statement are not totally clear, we can determine at 
least two points.  First, there is a long metaphysical tradition of treating the infinite as 
divine, as one finds in the writings of St. Augustine, whose statements in book twelve 
of The City of God were of particular interest to Cantor, and St. Thomas.  Second, the 
                                                     
11 Georg Cantor, Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten, Gesammelte Abhandlungen: Mathematischen und 
Philosophischen Inhalts, ed. Adolf Fraenkel, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962, p. 401. 
12 Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten, p. 405. 
13 The quotation is from a 1908 letter Cantor wrote to G. C. Young, taken from Joseph Dauben, Georg 
Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 290. 
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‘Absolute’ here is treated as incomprehensible, which has also often been taken to be 
a mark of the divine.  Indeed, this incomprehensibility was, for Cantor, directly linked 
with the problematic status of overly large ordinals, and he was willing to accept the 
existence of inconsistent collections as a result.14 
In public statements, while he remained slightly more reserved about the 
situation, he nevertheless held that the Absolute was incomprehensible.  For example, 
take the following statement. 
I have no doubt at all that in this way we extend ever further, never reaching 
and insuperable barrier, but also never reaching even approximate 
comprehension of the Absolute.  The Absolute can only be recognized, never 
known, not even approximately.15 
We see, then, that even publicly he was willing to countenance that a kind of mystery 
was attached to the status of the Absolute, and he did not seek immediately to resolve 
inconsistencies by stipulating them away (as Zermelo did).   
What are we to make of these statements as philosophers?  Do they contain 
anything of which we might use for a conceptual revolution?  As they stand, we must 
agree with Badiou that they do not.  Understood philosophically, it is clear that 
‘Cantor’s thought thus wavers between onto-theology—for which the absolute is 
thought as a supreme infinite being ... and mathematical ontology’, or contemporary 
set theory (BE 42).  The reason for this is that, as Cantor’s biographer Joseph Dauben 
notes, Cantor did not think that the inconsistency of the Absolute ‘compromised the 
consistency of his own set theory.  He was perfectly willing to assert that his theory 
was completely free of contradictions, and this he regarded as an established fact’.16  
The inconsistency of the Absolute is thus sealed within its incomprehensibility, and so 
opens onto the same road that onto-theologians have traveled for millennia by acting 
as the final form of presence that grounds all being. 
Yet, there is an unexplored possibility here.  The reason Cantor remains an onto-
theologian is because he coupled this Absolute with consistency.  But what if we were 
to affirm only what Cantor proved, namely that the existence of such an Absolute is 
inconsistent?  Furthermore, what if there were a deeper truth here, namely that Cantor could not 
but assert the existence of the paradoxical, Absolutely Infinite?  Then the Absolute, decoupled 
                                                     
14 See Georg Cantor’s 1899 ‘Letter to Dedekind’ on this matter in From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in 
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, ed. and trans. by Jean van Heijenoort, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1967, pp. 113-7. 
15 Cantor’s words quoted from Michael Hallett, Cantorian Set Theory and the Limitation of Size, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 42. 
16 Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 246.  Dauben relates that this is the content of 
a 1886 letter Cantor wrote to Eulenberg. 
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from consistency would still remain a Whole, some form of unity, but it could not play 
its onto-theological role.  What we suggest, then, is that a distinction be drawn 
between the problematic onto-theological Whole, which affirms ‘that beyond the 
multiple, even in the metaphor of its inconsistent grandeur, the one is’, and a post-
Cantorian inconsistent Whole, which affirms the thinkability of this inconsistency (BE 
42).  Even as Badiou recognizes, this inconsistent multiplicity constitutes a form of 
excess (excès), since it is not a set (Cantor called only consistent multiplicities sets).  
What we have before us, then, is an alternative account of excess; another way to 
approach the inexistent, another approach to events.  Can we affirm this form of 
excess, as heirs to Cantor’s revolution, rather than Zermelo’s revolution?  This is the 
task we set before ourselves. 
4. ON TRUE CONTRADICTIONS 
Our aim in addressing Badiou now becomes polemical.  We are going to try to affirm 
explicitly what Badiou axiomatically denies as a possibility: that there is a whole and 
that it is inconsistent, which is equivalent to affirming what Cantor proved about the 
Absolute.  This task requires two steps.  First, we are going to have to provide 
plausible logical grounds for accepting what will appear to be an absurdity to anyone 
who is not familiar with the literature on paraconsistent (especially dialetheic) logics.  
To do this, we are going to make use of the work of Graham Priest, a contemporary 
logician, and address a few questions about rationality that follow from accepting this 
logic.  This point will provide us with some grounds for questioning the adequacy of 
Badiou’s treatment of logic in relation to mathematics.  Following these tasks, we shall 
turn to Derrida, who will provide a separate, philosophic motivation for accepting the 
Cantorian Absolute. 
4.1 Reasonability 
Let us begin with the apparent absurdity: the existence of true contradictions seems to 
require that one jettison the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), and it would make 
rational discourse impossible.  In response, we mean principally to remove the 
impression of this absurdity.17  An additional aim, however, is to bridge the divide 
between the Anglo-American discourse on the philosophy of logic and the current 
mathematical turn inaugurated by Badiou in Continental discourse. 
                                                     
17 For a full (and non-technical) review of some of the most common objections to dialetheism, see 
Graham Priests’ ‘What is so bad about contradictions?’, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 95, 1998, pp. 410-426. 
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To begin then, we recall that a paraconsistent logic is one in which the semantic 
consequence relation, namely ٧, is not explosive.  Here, the term ‘explosion’ is only a 
colorful expression for stating that from a contradiction whatever follows, which is 
symbolized as {P ¬P} ٧ Q.  Such a logic need not be dialetheic, since one may 
have alternative motivations in denying explosion, though in our current case this is 
precisely what we want. 
Dialetheism, then, is the view that there are some statements that are both true and 
false, which is to say that for some proposition P, its conjunction with its negation ¬P, 
is true.  In order to avoid trivialism, which is the position that all contradictions are 
true, the dialetheist needs to adopt some paraconsistent logic.  The most famous 
paraconsistent logic that captures this position is Priest’s ‘Logic of Paradox’ (LP).18 
The central move here is to establish that statements may take three values: true and 
only true, false and only false, and both true and false.  True contradictions are 
statements of this last kind.  Such a position certainly seems to run afoul of the LNC.  
The best response available to the dialetheist on this point is also the simplest: one 
cannot invoke the LNC as an objection to dialetheism without begging the question.  
With this response, we take it that the absurdity is removed for two reasons.  First, in 
response, the classical logician must propose some reasons for accepting the LNC.  
Second, these would be reasons about which we would have to argue.  Since we are 
arguing at this point, we take it that the position is no longer considered absurd.19 
Responding to this last task point, however, might seem easy.  For example, it is 
likely that one would object that this position nevertheless seems to reduce reasoning 
to gibberish.  If contradictions can be true, then how could one ever prove another 
person wrong?  Do we not need consistency in order to be rational?  Finally, and most 
interestingly, would not this position require a revision of logic, especially of what is 
normally meant by the LNC?  But how is logical revision even possible?  Though we 
could raise more questions, let us try and answer just these under the following 
                                                     
18 Graham Priest’s ‘The Logic of Paradox’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 8, 1979, pp. 219-41.  In this 
logic, clearly, explosion fails, which is the whole point.  This gain comes with a price, however, since the 
disjunctive syllogism, along with modus ponens and modus tollens, also fails.  This means that material 
implication fails to capture ordinary conditional statements, but this problem is one that symmetrically 
plagues classical logic as well.  In order to address these drawbacks, Priest later suggests that RM3 is 
perhaps a better alternative in his own logic text An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics: From If to Is, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 127. 
19 The interesting point here, of course, is David Lewis’ concern that this debate would not be rational.  
There seem to be a number of good responses to this point.  See, for example, Otávio Bueno and Mark 
Colyvan in ‘Logical Non-Apriorism and the ‘Law’ of Non-Contradiction’, The Law of Non-Contradiction: 
New Philosophical Essays, eds. Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Amour-Garab, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 156-75. 
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simplified form: (1) What does reasonability consist in if there are true contradictions? 
(2) How is logical revision possible?  
With respect to reasonability, the answer is unsurprising, if disconcerting for 
Badiou: there are numerous other accepted criteria for reasonability besides 
consistency, and being reasonable just means accepting and drawing inferences 
according to these criteria, including consistency in consistent situations.  This position is 
just orthodoxy for contemporary debates in Anglo-American epistemology.  To use 
Priest’s example, the basic problem in arguing with a person who maintains that the 
earth is flat is not that she cannot provide responses to objections, but that there are 
no conceivable situations that could falsify her position.20  If one points out that 
humans have sailed around the earth, or that from space the earth looks round, she 
will answer that we have in fact sailed in a circle on a flat surface, or that the earth 
only appears to be round because light functions differently in space.  Her position 
fairs poorly, then, because it is non-falsifiable and because her responses are always ad 
hoc.  To hold to it, in the face of a superior rival position, as the flat-earther does, is 
just irrational.  Yet neither falsifiability, nor non-adhocness are criteria that appeal to 
consistency.  Nor are these the only ones available.  To recall just a few, one’s position 
should be adequate to the data, exhibit superior explanatory power to its rivals, and 
prove more fruitful.  Finally, even the dialetheist can appeal to consistency in 
consistent situations, since classical logic is only a restricted form of LP.  Furthermore, 
in situations that are inconsistent, there is at least good inductive evidence that 
contradictions are a sign that something has gone wrong.  Thus, there is just no 
reason to think that foregoing consistency requires that one exit rationality into some 
form of quietism or madness. 
We noted that this response would be troubling to Badiou, however, and this is 
the case for two reasons.  First, for him, while there may be rival subjects to an event 
(reactionary and obscure as opposed to faithful), he provides almost no grounds for 
determining which is superior.  Indeed, the only constraint he seems to impose on 
fidelity to an event is consistency (LW 487).  Our appeal to other categories of 
rationality, then, simply has no basis in his account.  Second, in Being and Event Badiou 
argues that fidelity to an event is determined by classical deduction (Meditation 24).  
In Logics of Worlds the stakes are heightened, since category theory more naturally 
follows intuitionist logic than classical.21  It is for this reason that Badiou must filter the 
theory of points through a Boolean world in order to retain a classical account of 
                                                     
20 Priest, ‘What is so Bad about Contradictions?’, p. 420. 
21 This point was established some time ago by Saul Kripke in ‘Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic 
I’, Formal Systems and Recursive Functions, ed. by J. N. Crossley and Michael Dummett, Netherlands, North-
Holland Publishing Co., 1965, pp. 92-130. 
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choice (book 4).  Granted these arguments, it follows that Badiou cannot give up 
classical logic.  For without them he cannot explain evental revolutions.22 This point, 
however, is one that we believe counts against Badiou, and to spell it out we are going 
to turn to the topic of logical revisability (our second question). 
4.2 Logic and Revisability 
One of the most striking features of Badiou’s position, for anyone familiar with Anglo-
American debates on these matters, is the way in which he tends to lump 
mathematics, science and logic together.  For example, when providing his subjective 
typology in Logics of Worlds, he writes that scientific subjects pursue mathematizable 
concepts, where ‘‘[m]athematizable’ means: submitted to the literal power of 
inferences’ (LW 74).  Badiou goes on, of course, to formulate the category-theoretic 
notion of dependence, from which the notion of (classical) material implication can be 
derived, as well as (one understanding of) physical causality, but the move remains 
contentious, since at least the way the disciplines proceed is entirely different from 
each other. The question we should like to pursue here is whether this treatment is 
adequate by focusing specifically on the relation of logic to mathematics.   
Badiou’s axiomatic adherence to classical logic appears problematic, since there is 
incontrovertible evidence that logic has undergone revision.  In his most recent book 
length study, Graham Priest reviews the actual logical revision that occurred in the 
move from Aristotelian syllogistic to contemporary ‘classical’ Frege-Russell logic.23  
His point is simple: the idea that classical logic extended Aristotle’s work to a more 
complete theory is false.24  We recall that the following syllogisms, tagged Darapti and 
Camestros by the Medievals respectively, are valid for Aristotelian syllogistic: 
 
All Bs are Cs 
All Bs are As 
Hence some As are Cs 
                                                     
22 For a related series of criticisms on this point with special reference to the status of intuitionism in Being 
and Event see Zachary Fraser’s ‘The Law of the Subject: Alain Badiou, Luitzen Brouwer and the 
Kirpkean Analysis of Forcing and the Heyting Calculus’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and 
Social Philosophy, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 94-133. 
23 See Graham Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) especially 
chapter 10. 
24 Apart from the considerations that follow, see also Jakko Hintikka’s and Vilkko Risto’s article 
‘Existence and Predication from Aristotle to Frege’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 73, 2006, 
pp. 359-377, which reviews the changes the existential quantifier has undergone from its Aristotelian form 
to that in Frege-Russell logic. 
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All Cs are Bs 
No As are Bs 
Hence some As are not Cs 
 
These are not arguments, however, that are valid in ‘classical’ logic.  Since the 
problem turns on the existential import of the quantifiers, if one adds the appropriate 
clauses to the A and E forms, one could render all syllogisms classically valid.  The 
difficulty, however, is that this would invalidate a central part of Aristotelian logic, 
namely the square of opposition.  There are other technical fixes that one could 
propose, but none achieve the aim of establishing the equivalence of ‘classical’ and 
Aristotelian logic.  Priest concludes his review on this point, then, by noting ‘however 
one interprets traditional logic in classical logic, something has to be given up’.25 
Granted this change we ask: what sense can Badiou make of such logical revision?  
The whole framework for evental change presupposes such classical logic (with its 
specific understanding of quantifiers), yet even this has changed.  Logicians have 
numerous responses at their disposal, which would rely on extra-logical 
considerations, but Badiou has none of these.26  Any position that would be able to 
explain such revision, then, seems to fair better than Badiou’s currently.  At the very 
least, then, a counter-problem is posed for Badiou: he must specify in a way that is 
more fine-grained than his current consistentist account, what it is that mathematics, 
science and logic all share and how they are different in such a way that logic may 
equally undergo evental change.  Our Derridian position that follows, which 
countenances dialetheias, is clearly open to this kind of logical revision. 
5.  THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNDECIDABLE 
Priest’s work is, at least in the capacity presented here, useful to our enterprise only 
insofar as he enables us to disrupt the smooth surface of Badiou’s onto-logical edifice.  
While the latter remains axiomatically attached to classical logic, we have produced 
grounds that show that this is not the only option available.  Indeed, his insistence on 
this form of logic closes his position from entering the debate on the rationality of 
                                                     
25 Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, p. 167.  See this section also for alternative proposals to save the 
Aristotelian syllogistic, and why they fail. 
26 For example, Michael D. Resnick in ‘Revising Logic’, The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical 
Essays, eds. Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Amou-Garab, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2004, pp. 178-194 makes a case for logical revision as aiming for a Rawlsian ‘reflective equilibrium’.  Also 
Otávio Bueno and Mark Colyvan’s point in ‘Logical Non-Apriorism and the ‘Law’ of Non-
Contradiction’ is just to extend Larry Laudan’s reticulated model of scientific change to logic. 
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logic revision, and so provides grounds for questioning whether Badiou’s treatment of 
logic is adequate.  In short, then, Priest opens a space for thought.   
In order to dwell in this space, we ask the reader some patience as we review some 
ground that is well-trod in Derridean scholarship.  Our interest in these matters is 
novel and likely contentious (as scholarship) insofar as the predominant account of 
Derrida attempts to defend his position from contradiction by arguing for some form 
of semantic dodge.  The payoff for our move, clearly, is an ability to respond to 
Badiou’s criticism of all things phenomenological and hermeneutic.  Let us begin, 
then, by reviewing Derrida’s concern with Husserl. 
5.1 The Phenomenology of Undecidability I 
Much of Derrida’s early work is motivated by the need to critique an Ideal, an 
evaluation of rationality that he sees has followed the history of philosophy since at 
least Plato.27  In his early Introduction to his translation of Edmund Husserl’s ‘The 
Origin of Geometry’, the name that he gives to his own counter ideal is undecidability.  
Here, Derrida demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenological investigations, 
especially those carried out in the Formal and Transcendental Logic and Ideas I, must have 
recourse to one form of this Ideal, which they also expressly prohibit.  The Ideal that 
Husserl prohibits is known in mathematics as completeness.  Roughly, a formal 
theory is said to be complete when no statement can be produced within the system 
the truth or falsity of which cannot be determined, tertium non datur or no third 
alternative being given.  This Ideal must be excluded, or reduced within Husserl’s 
phenomenology, since the ‘primordial evidence [Husserl] investigates here are for 
him prior to those of axioms and serve as their ground’.28  Yet, Derrida asks, what 
about the unity of geometry’s primordial sense, which orients the whole of the 
investigation in ‘The Origin of Geometry’?  What, exactly, ‘is mathematical 
determinability in general, if the undecidability of a proposition, for example, is still a 
mathematical determination’ (I 56)?  Kurt Gödel’s undecidability, then, has ‘a 
                                                     
27 One may wonder at the reason for the capitalization of Ideal here.  Our answer is two-fold.  At times, 
Derrida himself undertakes to capitalize this term as an Idea, see for example Speech and Phenomena: And 
Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
1973, p. 100 (henceforth SP).  Yet, more important is the need to be clear on this term, which Derrida 
explicitly identifies as a value, and not simply an eidos.  The Greek term phonē is one name for this value, 
but so too is the Kantian conception of a regulative idea, Husserl’s eidetic intuitions, and in the current 
case, the mathematical notion of completeness (SP 77, 100, 101).  It is, in short, the evaluative facet of the 
metaphysics of presence. 
28 Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavey, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989, pp. 54-5 (henceforth I). 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 165 
revolutionary and disconcerting sense’, because it shows that Husserl’s Ideal is itself 
derived from precisely the history it is supposed to explain (I 53n48).  Thus, it is not 
surprising that Derrida valorizes undecidability as a ‘tertium datur’, and opposes it to 
Husserl’s pure phenomenological decidability (I 54).   
Despite the warrant for this point, Derrida did not complete his criticism of 
Husserl in this early work.  Even if Husserl covertly imports his ideal, he might still 
maintain that within the bounds of solitary mental life, such purity might be possible 
and that language itself remains only as an expedient necessary in order to 
communicate.  It is to accomplish this larger task that he undertakes the investigation 
in Speech and Phenomena.  It is here, then, that one finds the fullest (early) statement of 
undecidability, which we aim to recover in five points. 
(1) The first point is the well-known deconstruction of Husserlian phenomenology, 
which shows, in brief, that every phenomenon requires an inapparent that allows it to 
appear.  Stated otherwise, difference is original (SP 82).  Though the argument is well 
known, in order to make this essay reasonably self-contained, we are going to review 
its central points.  If in his Introduction Derrida shows that the Ideal that oriented 
Husserl in Origin is a kind of illegal alien in the land of pure transcendental 
consciousness, here Derrida uses the same logic to argue that there is no origin at all, 
that representation (Vergegenwärtigung) is always already at work prior to presentation 
(Gegenwärtigung). To establish this claim Derrida looks at Husserl’s argument in the first 
logical investigation that there is a central distinction between two kinds of signs: 
expression (Ausdruck) and indications (Anzeigen).  Generally a sign is something that 
stands for something else.  Expressions are those signs that bear a meaning, as are 
found in human language.  Indications, such as smoke from a fire, are only empirical 
pointers (SP 17).  Importantly, however, Husserl does hold that expressions may also 
be indications, particularly as intimations.29  When another person speaks to me, I 
grasp not only the meaning of her expression, but also that these signs intimate that 
these meanings are her ‘thoughts’.  Critically for Derrida, there is in fact only one case 
where an expression does not also intimate, that is to say there is only one instance 
that separates indication from expression: solitary mental life or soliloquy.  In the case 
of soliloquy Husserl argues that one does not intimate to oneself because one does not 
need to do so.  Intimation in solitary mental life is useless (zwecklos) for ‘the acts in 
question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment [im selben Augenblick]’.30  
Nothing, not the blink of an eye, divides pure consciousness from itself.  In response to 
                                                     
29 Edmund Husserl, ‘Investigation I: Expression and Meaning’, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Finlay, 
New York: Routledge Press, 1970, §7. 
30 Husserl, ‘Investigation I: Expression and Meaning’, §8. 
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this argument, Derrida points out that Husserl refutes his own claim, since in his 
investigations of internal time consciousness Husserl argues that the ‘now’ of the lived 
present is thick.  It has a retentive-attentive-protentive structure that is not at all 
punctiliar.  In response to this phenomenological description, of which Derrida 
approves, he only asks: what in principle is the difference between retention, which is in 
the intuitive lived present, and memory, which Husserl establishes as reproductive 
secondary memory?  A moment, after all, is not something slightly lapsed.  And if one 
were to consider it this, how long is this slight lapse?  When does it cease being part of 
the lived present and become a product of secondary reproductive memory?  This 
distinction, Derrida argues, is specious.  It turns out, then, that ‘[t]his alterity [i.e. the 
reproductive memory] is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus for 
Vorstellung in general; it precedes all the dissociations that could be produced in 
presence, in Vorstellung’ (SP 65).  The living present, then, is invaded by an irreducible 
non-presence; it is the effect of re-presentation. 
The immediate result of Derrida’s deconstruction is double.  First, it constitutes a 
twisting free from the metaphysics of presence, the Ideal that Derrida did not quite 
critique in his earlier Introduction (SP 53).  Second, it establishes the finitude of 
phenomenology.   
(2) Taking these consequences in order, Derrida establishes three points of 
concern with respect to the metaphysics of presence.  First, he notes that there is a 
certain matrix, or systematic solidarity of central metaphysical concepts, such as 
‘sense, ideality, objectivity, truth, intuition, perception, and expression’ (SP 99).  All 
these concepts, however, found their ground in the moment (Augenblick) that Derrida 
has just shown to be impossible save as an original re-presentation.  The meaning that 
they had, then, is altered radically.  Specifically, the notion of the beginning or 
ground of these concepts, their archē, must be relinquished, including the Kantian and 
Husserlian understanding of the transcendental ‘I’.  The same point, however, holds 
for any final telos that would unite these concepts.  All such notions are only so many 
versions of the Ideal, the rational value, which must be relinquished (SP 101).  A 
second feature of this twisting free concerns deconstructive immanence.  Having no 
present on which to ground the eidetic features of consciousness, any 
phenomenologist must symmetrically relinquish the classical understanding of eidoi as 
timeless and unchanging, and rather accept in their place the indefinite repeatability 
of signs.  This substitution constitutes the immanence of Derrida’s position, since it 
abrogates the possibility of referring to something outside this relation of meaning (SP 
104).  It is with this step, then, that the Kantian distinction between the de facto and de 
jure loses its significance, as the latter becomes only a special case of the former (SP 
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99).  Finally, Husserl’s account of phenomenological evidence and truth, which are 
modeled on the fulfillment of empty meaning intentions, must be evacuated.  As 
Husserl himself notes, meaningful intentions function adequately without such 
fulfillment.  That we should take this absence as a norm, as constitutive of these 
phenomena rather than contingent aberrations, follows both from this well-
functioning and the impossibility of founding presence (SP 97). 
(3) The other consequence of Derrida’s deconstruction is that it establishes the 
(radical) finitude of phenomenology.  We have already noted that there is no 
transcendental ‘I’ that could serve as an archē, and this just means that when I say ‘I’ 
even in soliloquy, this ‘I’ does not appear without absence (SP 95).  A first facet of 
phenomenological finitude, then, is the contamination of life and death.  ‘My death’, 
Derrida writes, ‘is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the I’ (SP 96).  The 
reason for this is that my absence, in order to be meaningful, is requisite for the 
ideality of the I.  Yet, with the collapse of the lived presence into absence, this 
distinction between empirical I and transcendental I, lived I and the I that survives my 
death through written inscription, cannot be maintained.  The second facet of this 
finitude concerns its radicality.  For just as the distinction between life and death is 
contaminated, so too is the opposition between the finite (empirical) and infinite 
(indefinitely repeatable).  If the living present is deferred ad infinitum, if the Kantian 
Idea can only appear with its absence, this is because the ‘appearing of the infinite 
differance is itself finite’ (SP 102).  Even différance, the quasi-structure of intentional signs, 
only appears as finite, only achieves the infinite through indefinite repetition, and 
hence can ‘no longer be conceived within the opposition of finiteness and infinite, 
absence and presence, negation and affirmation’ (ibid.).  This finitude proper to the 
very structuring of phenomenal appearing (and dis-appearing), then, displaces the old 
opposition between the finite and the infinite.  This finitude is thus properly radical, 
and it is the finitude proper to this new radical phenomenology. 
5.2 The Phenomenology of Undecidability II 
We come now to the final two points concerning Derrida, and we have marked them 
off from the others since it is here that we shall expose ourselves to some risk.  The 
foregoing we take to be non-contentious, what follows is the requisite step from 
commentary into interpretation—something for which we alone must take 
responsibility. 
(4) We begin, then, with what may be called Derrida’s quasi-realism.  It has been a 
fear of some critics of Derrida (notably Jürgen Habermas), that the displacement of 
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the de jure and de facto abrogates any possibility of rationality.31  What we want to note 
here is that Derrida’s argument turns on a certain kind of ‘realism’, that is to say, he 
holds that we do have access to the things themselves.  This is why Derrida is clear 
(point 3) that even différance must quasi-appear (which is a point of self-reflexive 
consistency).  We take Derrida at his word when he claims that this investigation 
occurs ‘within the metaphysics of presence’, and that it is only possible ‘through 
Husserl’s text’ (SP 102, 88).32  By unfounding the opposition between the de jure and 
the de facto, Derrida does not undercut his own ability to make his claims; he is not an 
anti-realist or a skeptic.  True to the ‘the principle of all principles’, he holds that our 
conscious intentions are always already in touch with the phenomena.  In this sense, 
then, he is a realist.  Yet, and this is why the tag ‘quasi-’ must be appended, Derrida is 
equally far from the classical notion of certitude. While he holds that we can access 
the things themselves, his deconstruction of Husserl nevertheless shows that the 
phenomena, the things themselves, are radically finite.  They always carry with them 
something that we cannot know in advance, something of a secret, some no-thing that 
destabilizes their presence.  Because of this absence, because the real lacks the 
character of an eternal present, something stable and unchanging, the very notion of 
the de jure and de facto is displaced.  Even though we can lay a claim to die Sache Selbst, 
they are not of such a character that the notion of an ‘in principle’ describes them.  
Here, then, Derrida approaches the in-stability of Badiou’s ontological universe, in 
which there is an errancy at the heart of being that allows for events.  The difference 
is that for Derrida, being itself must be understood significatively, since there is no 
easy escape from language to being. 
(5) These points bring us to the aim of these previous steps, which Derrida states 
in his introduction as follows:  
What is only at issue is to make the original and non-empirical space of non-
foundation appear over the irreducible void on the basis of which the security of 
presence in the metaphysical form of ideality is decided and raised up.  It is 
                                                     
31 See Habermas’ The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, especially chapter 7 and the following excursus. 
32 This point is of course pure Rodolphe Gasché as one finds in The Train of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy 
of Reflection, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.  Stating it as a quasi-realism (rather than quasi-
transcendentalism) has the particular advantage of highlighting the difference between Derrida and 
Donald Davidson.  Samuel C. Wheeler III, for example, in Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2000, argues that Derrida’s denial of presence is equivalent to Davidson’s 
denial of the given.  Though we have learned much from Wheeler’s work, we part company here.  The 
suggestion of point (4) is not that there is no given, but that there is no pure given—that is a given that 
does not also include its absence.  The difference here is significant, since Davidson remains a strong 
anti-realist while Derrida is not. 
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within this horizon that we will here interrogate the phenomenological concept 
of the sign (SP 7 emphasis added). 
In his own words, then, Derrida’s aim is to ‘make appear’ (faire apparaître) a certain 
experience (éprouvé) of an irreducible void on which the metaphysics of presence is 
founded.  He aims to return us to a moment before Husserl’s decision on signs, that is, 
to a moment of undecidability.  Derrida is interested in what is ‘beyond’ absolute 
knowledge.  If deconstruction occurs within metaphysics, it also goes ‘beyond’ it—but 
only in quotes.  Specifically, it seeks to respond to the question that is unheard-of, one 
that is not simply a question of Being.  It attends to ‘the memory of old signs’, to 
something ‘older’ (plus vieux) than presence (SP 102, 103).  Here in this older space 
‘[w]e no longer know whether the force of the Vergenenwärtigung … whether the 
repetitive force of the living present … or whether what we call with the old names of 
force and differance is not more ‘ancient’ than what is ‘primordial’’ (SP 103).  The 
response to the unheard-of question, then, brings us to an experience of undecidability, 
‘prior’ to those decisions of metaphysics. 
But what exactly is this experience?  Furthermore, how can Derrida even say that 
it is what structures the relation of signs?  Does he not inevitably run up against self-
referential inconsistencies?  A number of responses are possible, but before turning to 
our own response, we want to point out what appears to be deficient in one of the 
most widely held positions: the semantic dodge.  Here commentators claim that Derrida 
is writing ‘under erasure/ sous rature’, so that he only points or formally indicates this 
experience of undecidability, which is literally meaningless.  Taken simply, this 
strategy clearly fails because in order to succeed, Derrida must express exactly what 
he means in order to be understood at all.33  This is why commentators often 
strengthen this response to the experiential semantic dodge.34  They insist that Derrida is 
                                                     
33 This is the point that Graham Priest makes in his own take on Derrida in chapter 14 of Beyond the Limits 
of Thought, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
34 This is not, of course, the route that all commentators take.  I draw attention here to just two cases of 
some better Derridians.  First, Gayatri Spivak, in her monograph length introduction to Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology, Baltimore, John Hopkings University Press, 1974, trans. Gayatri Spivak, suggests that this 
meaninglessness may continue all the way down.  She writes: ‘Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs 
deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation ... and as the pleasure of the bottomless’, p. lxxvii.  
The regress here is problematic, since we do after all understand Derrida.  John Caputo, in Radical 
Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1987, fastens onto this latter fact stating: ‘Truth, after all, is necessary—that is to say, we 
need our fictions’, p. 145.  Yet, the recourse to pragmatic fiction needs to be specified somehow, for one 
must make the case for why we only have pragmatic fictions.  This much must be undeconstructable.  In 
what follows, I take myself to be closest to Leonard Lawlor’s account in Derrida and Husserl: The Basic 
Problem of Phenomenology, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002, since he there 
focuses on the experience of deconstruction as an aporia. 
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indicating or making appear a certain experience, which cannot fully be articulated in 
words.  It is this (silent) experience that finally constitutes the twisting free from 
Platonism, since it shows how the division into sensible and intelligible is not itself 
originary.  Here, they insist, is Derrida’s lasting merit, since he allows us to dwell at 
the threshold of the metaphysics of presence. 
We should be wary of this approach for two reasons.  First, it puts Derrida right in 
line with Badiou’s critique of phenomenology and hermeneutics as nihilist, since it 
claims that these limit situations constitute the peril of thought, rather than the 
beginning point for transformative intervention.35  Second, Derrida himself denounces 
it.  In his essay ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’ one of Derrida’s central concerns 
is the very possibility of writing a history of what is outside reason, which Foucault at 
points claims to be doing.  In response, Derrida notes that this difficulty of accessing 
the outside, ‘or this impossibility, must reverberate within the language used to 
describe the history of madness’.36   He then considers a response almost identical to 
the experiential semantic dodge: ‘One could perhaps say that the resolution of this 
difficulty is practiced rather than formulated.  By necessity.  I mean that the silence of 
madness is not said, cannot be said in the logos of this book, but is indirectly, 
metaphorically, made present by its pathos—taking this word in its best sense’.37  He 
concludes that this response, however, is not adequate: 
Now to state the difficulty, to state the difficulty of stating, is not yet to surmount 
it—quite to the contrary....Who perceives, who enunciates the difficulty?  These 
efforts can be made neither in the wild and inaccessible silence of madness, nor 
simply in the language of the jailer, that is, the language of classical reason, but 
only in the language of someone for whom [they are] meaningful.38 
The pathos about which Derrida speaks is not exactly the experience of the 
undecidable, but it functions similarly as a response.  The idea in both cases is that 
there is some kind of experience beyond the language of reason that these various 
histories or deconstructions are meant to indicate through some manner that is 
indirect.  This does not work, as Derrida himself notes, because for it to succeed, it 
must be possible for this experience to escape language—somehow.  Otherwise, if it 
                                                     
35 We let pass Badiou’s direct and explicit charge that Derrida is a sophist rather than a philosopher in 
Conditions, p. 20.  Our thesis, however, directly refutes this point, since we aim to show that Derrida was 
not concerned with the relation between the ineffable and the sayable, which is one of Badiou’s 
formulation of sophism in Conditions, but rather what stands beyond classical reason, p. 6. 
36 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 
37. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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remains in any way within language, it would not be radical enough to avoid self-
referential inconsistency.  Yet there is no such vantage point, which is the meaning of 
deconstructive immanence (point 2).  This is why we do not think the experiential 
semantic dodge works, and (equally) why Derrida himself denounces it. 
Our position follows directly from these attempted responses, since we aim to 
remove the motivation for them by suggesting that the preoccupation with contradiction is 
obviated by the existence of paraconsistent logics.  Rather than advocate any form of 
semantic dodge, we hold that the experience of the undecidable just is the experience 
of the inconsistency of the whole.  As a result, it suggests the inescapability of a true 
contradiction, and provides a motivation to accept dialetheism.  Our position still 
twists free from Platonism by retaining a crucial role for an originary experience that 
escapes the distinction of the sensible and intelligible.  This experience is that of 
undecidability, which affirms the whole of signifying phenomena as inconsistent.  The 
central difference between our position and that which we have called the semantic 
dodge is that it forgoes the need to retain classical reason.  We do not hold that 
Derrida’s position is somehow beneath or prior to logic, but rather that it is attentive 
to the ways in which classical logic fails.39 
Because we have parted company with some excellent Derridian thinkers, and 
because it will clarify needless confusion, we shall here respond to one plausible 
objection to our final point.  One might contend that the experience of the 
undecidable is not the experience of true contradictions.  What Derrida is after is the 
way in which guardrails or decision procedures are to be avoided.  As John Caputo 
notes in Radical Hermeneutics: ‘The real obstacle to understanding human affairs lies in 
the tendency to believe that what we do ... admits of formulation in hard and 
irrevocable rules’.40  Derrida is against all method and predictability, and favors the 
anarchy (an-archē) that is always beyond some particular method.  But settling for a 
paraconsistent logic (dialetheism or anything else) is precisely to lay claim that this 
method is the right one! 
We agree with all that has been said; we only go further.  For it must be possible 
to suggest why it is that we must be wary of all guardrails and methods—this is an 
apriori claim, something, like justice, that cannot be deconstructed.  First, let us recall 
                                                     
39 Derrida seems to state this point almost exactly in Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, as follows: ‘Since it can no longer be subsumed by the generality of logical 
contradiction, differance (the process of differentiation) permits a differentiated accounting for 
heterogeneous modes of conflictuality, or, if you will, for contradictions’, p. 101.  That Derrida had little 
or no knowledge of formal paraconsistent logics explains why he held différance escaped (classical) logical 
contradiction, but nevertheless affirms some other form of contradiction. 
40 Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, p. 212. 
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that our thesis is that the experience of undecidability is the experience of an 
inconsistent whole.  Derrida’s quasi-realism (point 4) affirms that we have access to 
this whole, and this is the way things are (and are not).  Since this whole is 
inconsistent, it follows as a matter of course that this is also an experience of a true 
contradiction, so Derrida is a dialetheist too.  Or rather, dialetheism seems to be the 
best logic we have to capture Derrida’s position, and it relieves us of needless semantic 
gymnastics. If we are right about this, then we have here a second path to infinite 
thought. 
6.  A SECOND PROGRAM FOR INFINITE THOUGHT  
 We have at this point established the grounds by which one might legitimately claim 
that Derrida’s account of the experience of the undecidable is the experience of the 
inconsistent whole.  The path to this summit has not been easy, but we should like to 
conclude here by collecting the various threads of the argument and pointing out a 
few of the items that may be seen from here. 
We began with our own deconstruction of Badiou’s ontological enterprise in Being 
and Event by noting the unmentioned name that guides his thought there as well as in 
the later Logics of Worlds: Ernst Zermelo.  His path to the infinite, then, quickly drops 
Cantor, and thus leaves open a possible separate path to infinite thought, one in which 
the infinite is affirmed as the Absolutely Infinite, which is to say, as an inconsistent 
whole.  The work on dialetheism, especially by Graham Priest, clears the space for 
one to follow this path in a double way.  First, it shows in a fully rigorous way that 
fears about the evacuation of reason, which follow upon the acceptance of true 
contradictions, are unwarranted.  Second, it provides a counter problem for Badiou.  
The latter claims to be a philosopher of change, and yet his position is structurally cut 
off from considerations of logical revisability.  At the very least, then, this shows that 
Badiou’s treatment of logic in relation to math and science is not sufficiently fine 
grained.  He will have to distinguish these better than he has.  We turned, finally, to a 
phenomenological motivation for accepting true contradictions in which we followed 
Derrida’s early deconstruction of Husserl.  This use of deconstruction turns on two 
contentious points of interpretation: (i) that deconstruction is quasi-realist, and (ii) that 
deconstruction does not finally try some form of semantic dodge to avoid self-
referential inconsistency.  Rather, this kind of paradox is typical of what occurs at the 
limits of thought and constitutes the very experience of undecidability.  To affirm 
such an inconsistency is to affirm that the whole of thought is inconsistent, which is 
just to affirm one of the most critical aspects of Cantor’s Absolutely Infinite. 
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Let us take some time, now, to spell out a few consequences of this affirmation, for 
as yet it is unable to respond to Badiou’s critique of finitude.  To begin, we must say 
what exactly is infinite about this Derridian inconsistent whole.  The answer requires 
us to recall what precisely is infinite in Badiou’s own thought.  His point is not only 
that we are mathematically able to think the infinite, but more importantly that 
infinite thought changes one’s orientation from a focus on limit situations to 
intervention.  The entire point is that a focus on such limit situations, especially 
historically constituted ones, has paralyzed thought and can only be called nihilism if 
affirmed.  For Derrida to affirm inconsistency at the limits of thought, then, only 
makes him a peculiar liminal thinker, but no more infinite than Kant or Hegel.41 
Our response is that the Derridian affirmation of inconsistency does translate into 
a program for intervention.  For Badiou, in Being and Event at least, the site for 
intervention is established as a possibility by the discrepancy between membership 
and inclusion.  In one of his now (in)famous attacks on Deleuze, Badiou argues it is 
because Deleuze lacks such a distinction that he fails to make the turn into infinite 
thought.42  By contrast, the Derridian affirmation of inconsistency, the radical finitude 
of phenomena, requires that discrepancies similar to the membership/inclusion kind 
are always possible.  One can never finally ‘count’ a unity, and it is the practice of 
deconstruction above all others that has taught us to be attentive to this feature of 
signs.  Such radical finitude gives rise to an infinite task of deconstructive vigilance, 
and thus requires rather than blocks intervention. 
Fine, Badiou might respond, but how is it to be carried out?  In Being and Event 
there is not only a matheme for intervention, namely the axiom of choice, but also a 
matheme for situation change, namely Cohen forcing, and these procedures are both 
deepened and fine-tuned in Logics of Worlds through an account of points, bodies, and 
subject forms.  Where is any of that in Derrida? 
Our answer can only be that this much remains to be accomplished.  Derrida’s 
position was developed in a largely different context of intellectual concerns.  That he 
did not anticipate the exact requirements of his later opponents is not to be counted 
against him.  Yet, at this point it must be admitted, and this was our major point of 
concern, that there is a second path to infinite thought.  Not everything is in place already, 
                                                     
41 Even in Badiou’s most ameliorative essay towards Derrida, ‘Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)’, Pocket 
Pantheon: Figures of Postwar Philosophy, trans. by David Macey, New York, Verso Press, 2009, pp. 125-44, 
which was written as a tribute, he still does not credit Derrida with having made the turn to infinite 
thought.  Instead, he argues that Derrida’s greatness to be able to locate the inexistent of a world, which 
might begin an evental truth, but not that he recognized the need for evental intervention. 
42 Badiou mentions precisely this point in his essay ‘One, Multiple, Multiplicities’, Theoretical Writings, ed. 
and trans. by Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano, New York, Continuum Press, 2006, pp. 71-2. 
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but at least the ground has been cleared.  The kind of intervention that Badiou is after 
may be affirmed from a Derridian position, so that the charges of nihilism and 
finitude are shown to be unfounded.  Furthermore, this means that it is possible to 
affirm that there is a whole, provided one is sure to recognize that this whole is 
inconsistent, and so hardly Hegel’s Absolute or any other onto-theological notion. 
We close, then, with a program of research that might entice us to explore this 
new ground a bit further.  To date, much Derridian scholarship has been captivated 
by the notion that somehow dwelling in this experience of undecidability is enough.  
To meet Badiou’s charge, however, we must focus instead on the passage to 
intervention.  From what we have reviewed here, a first helpful step would be to 
address a provisional (always for Derrida) inconsistent ontology.  This point follows 
directly from Derrida’s quasi-realism.  One way to undertake this task might be to 
look to his work on the khōra, which directly concerns one of the most problematic 
points of traditional metaphysics.  Another interesting route to take might be to 
pursue a purely set-theoretic response.  Ross T. Brady, for example in his essay ‘The 
Non-Triviality of Dialectial Set Theory’, develops an inconsistent set theory by use of 
the naïve axiom of comprehension.43  Many interesting points follow, not the least of 
which is that the matheme of an evental site can no longer be {xX, ex}, since self-
inclusion is not problematic in the same way.  Second, while it is not clear how to 
specify truth procedures, it appears that Derrida’s approach to art may be suitable to 
begin this task.  Furthermore, Derrida’s account of truth in no way requires that art, 
politics, love, and science remain the only truth procedures.  As an atheist, he was at 
least willing to countenance the structure of religion (without religion) as a truth 
procedure, and it is not out of bounds to consider the possibility of recovering 
economics as well.44  Third, since what is at stake in affirming an inconsistent whole is 
just an alternative account of events, a new account of the subject who sustains these 
events must be provided.  Derrida provides some clues for how this might be done 
already, and interestingly they suggest that this account should be elaborated in 
spatial terms.  In a footnote to his commentary on §36 of Husserl’s The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness, Derrida writes the following: ‘This being outside itself 
proper to time is its spacing: it is a proto-stage [archi-scène]’ (SP 84n9).  If the meaning of 
                                                     
43 See Ross T. Brady, ‘The Non-Triviality of Dialectial Set Theory’, Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the 
Inconsistent, eds. Graham Priest, Richard Routley, and Jean Norman, Munich: Philosphia Verlag, 1989, 
pp. 437-71. 
44 We note in passing that the use of ‘truth procedure’ here is somewhat equivocal with Badiou’s, since it 
is certainly not the case that it will function in the same way (starting from an evental site, forcing a truth 
on consistent grounds, and so on).  We beg the reader’s patience with what must remain for now a loose 
analogy. 
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Being and time were Heidegger’s concerns, they are equally Badiou’s, insofar as 
evental change constitutes his account of time.  Derrida, by contrast, must part 
company with both if this second path to infinite thought is to be followed.45  Finally, 
Derrida’s account of intervention allows one to develop an alternative conception of 
subjective fidelity or authenticity, which we call simply to kalon (beauty).   
Let us take a moment to develop this last closing point.  Badiou is quite clear on 
this score: everything that is incorporated into the body of a faithful subject must be 
consistent (LW 487).  For Badiou any failure here is a betrayal of what is beyond the 
merely animal in humans, and it is for this reason that his subjects, especially political 
subjects, are not personal subjects.  In our Cantorian path to infinite thought we 
wonder whether everything must be consistent.  First, Badiou seems to give up too much 
when he relinquishes the task of accounting for personal subjectivity.  Second, 
personal subjects are sometimes sub-ject to tragic circumstances, decisions between 
contradictory obligations, such as Antigone faces in relation to her brother (a kind of 
love Badiou seems not to recognize) and the state.  Aristotle taught us that for the 
virtuous, ‘even in such circumstances the beautiful shines through [dialampei to kalon], 
when a person bears many and great misfortunes gracefully, not because he does not 
feel them, but because he is noble and great of soul’.46  A Derridian subject, though 
faithful, may always be open to the fragility, the vulnerability, the wound-ability that 
inhabits, and that constitutes the human condition.  This is the condition of the animal 
that therefore I am (je suis).  Derridian fidelity would then amount to managing one’s 
contradictions well, or beautifully, rather than avoiding them.  By holding to this point 
Derrida thus seems to be able to illuminate the more profound dimensions of human 
existence as well as the need for intervention.  And it is here, in the humility of 
Derridia’s position, and not in the heroism of Badiou’s subject, that we find what is 
most fruitful in this approach. 
 
Department of Philosophy 
21 Campanella Way 
                                                     
45 Here, in many ways, John Sallis has already anticipated the need to make this move.  In Echoes: After 
Heidegger, Bloomington and Indianopolis: Indiana University Press, 1990, he argues that to overcome the 
difficulties of identifying Dasein and time, the latter must be understood as clearing (Lichtung) (see 
especially chapter 2).  This is a point that he has continued to pursue through his studies of Plato, as well 
as in his own deconstruction of Husserl’s transcendental imagination in chapter 7 of Double Truth, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995. 
46 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Lobe Classical Library: Aristotle XIX , ed. G. P. Goold, 1100b30-3.  The 
translation is my own, though clearly I consulted H. Rackham’s in the Lobe edition. 
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